Lord McKenzie of Luton: My Lords, the Liberal Democrats took that position when the matter was going through Parliament, but it not a question of either/or. I am sure that the noble Baroness is well aware of the statistics on the progress that government have made in reducing class sizes: investment in schools is seven times the level of capital investment in 1997; there has been a 50 per cent real terms increase in education expenditure since 1997; and I think that there are 5,000 more primary teachers and many more class assistants. That is happening already.

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, what is happening about looked-after children? Is the corporate parent topping-up the trust fund?

Lord Marsh: My Lords, the Minister is taking a rather calm view of this. Hedge funds played a not insignificant role in Black Wednesday, which a number of colleagues in the House will remember. These undoubtedly very powerful organisations are so secretive that, although they are a massive operation in the City, there is no reference to any of the funds in the Yellow Pages. Does the Minister accept that the FSA has done a very good job and has produced a very interesting document that is only 66 pages long? Is it likely to be published generally, and will the Government have a say in what it thinks?

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: My Lords, how can it be right that a Labour Administration north of the border ensures that elderly people get free continuing care, while a Labour Administration south of the border provides 20 per cent more per head in funding for services north of the border? Elderly people south of the border do not get free care and, in some cases, have had their houses sold in order to provide for it.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, we welcome the Statement from the Government and congratulate the chief inspector, Mr Wooler, on the comprehensive nature of his report within the constraints set on him. It was particularly helpful that he was able, with the assistance of Professor Sally Lloyd-Bostock and Dr Cheryl Thomas, to interview the members of the jury. I also welcome the Government's acceptance of the substance of the 11 recommendations.
	Some matters of importance in the ongoing debate on complex and lengthy trials were comprehensively illuminated. There were six counts. The fundamental flaw in the proceedings was count 2: conspiracy to defraud. The report states at paragraph 11.95 that,
	"count 1 was dealt with relatively expeditiously by both sides, and the evidence on the conspiracy to corrupt charges counts 3-6 was largely agreed by the defence making the admissions",
	that the Crown sought.
	The flawed decision was to bring an essentially vague charge of common law conspiracy to defraud in count 2 on the basis that the wrongful possession of commercially sensitive information by the defendants damaged the economic interests of London Underground Ltd. The decision was taken initially by the British Transport Police. However, although prosecuting counsel was initially ambivalent about continuing with the charge, as the report tells us, nevertheless he proceeded. As is the risk with the charge of common law conspiracy to defraud—as the report points out in paragraph 8(iii) of the executive summary—as the case progressed the Crown shifted its ground. The summary states that,
	"there were a number of changes in the way the Crown stated its position, in particular on what they accepted that they had to prove".
	In its final formulation, says the inspector:
	"It was inevitable that this would involve much detailed and repetitive examination of routine financial documents with witnesses".
	In the debates on the Fraud Bill both the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, and I pointed out the fundamental weakness of common law conspiracy, which the Law Commission has recommended be abolished. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord will forgive me if I remind him of what I said on 19 July last year:
	"To retain the broad common law offence of conspiracy to defraud is to leave things in the worst possible state. At times I have tried unsuccessfully to limit the scope of a conspiracy offence to the opening of prosecuting counsel, but I have not necessarily been successful in that effort. In one particular case I consider the ground had shifted over the course of a four-month trial, and that at the end I was being accused of something I was not being accused of at the beginning. That is the sort of problem which can be derived from the common law offence".—[Official Report, 19/7/05; col. 1442.]
	I had no knowledge then that the Jubilee Line case was a prime example of the Crown shifting its ground in the course of the trial.
	The prosecution sought to blame the defence for the trial becoming unmanageable as carrying out a "war of attrition". That is the sort of criticism that one frequently hears made against defence lawyers in all sorts of cases. However, it was not the defence who were responsible for the,
	"slow and disjointed nature of the proceedings".
	The inspector says in terms in paragraph 11.94 that the prosecution had an almost reflex reaction to what the defence was saying, so that it had a real reluctance to look at the merits of whatever the defence might say. As a result, there was a high degree of tension between the prosecution and the defence teams. But so far as the defence teams were concerned, the report concludes:
	"There was no deliberate time-wasting, prolixity or unjustifiable obstructiveness as is hinted at in the phrase 'war of attrition'".
	The responsibility for this trial failing is placed fairly and squarely upon the prosecution and there is no significant criticism of the defence in the report. The report finds that the jury discharged its duties in a thorough and comprehensive manner. The inspector says that it appeared months later that collectively the jury had a good grip of the evidence and the issues. There remained with it, he said, a real commitment to see through its period of public service. So the jury bears no responsibility.
	It is disappointing that, in the face of those conclusions, the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General told us that he took a different view on juries in long, complex fraud trials. That is not surprising. The Government persist in trying to undermine the structure of the criminal justice system. Not only do the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary attack judges directly for their decisions, which they do not appear ever to have read, but the Attorney General also seeks to limit the role of the one institution, the jury, that commands public confidence as a protector of our liberties.
	I have a number of questions. Why in 1997—a significant date—was the Fraud Investigation Group, set up originally as part of the CPS, wound down and assimilated in central case work, and the authority to sign transfers of cases to the Crown Court devolved to grade six lawyers? Why did a culture develop in the succeeding years within the CPS which allowed a lack of engagement with and responsibility for prosecutions at levels above that of the case lawyer? This trial had been running for nearly two years before the DPP became involved and started to oversee what was going wrong with it. Is it not a disgrace that the report concludes:
	"The other notable feature of the period spanned by the case, 1997-2005, is the persistent lack of clarity in relation to where responsibility for decision making lay, and consequently accountability"?
	When will the new fraud prosecution service be fully operational, because it is not yet, and what will its relationship be with the Serious Fraud office? The report says that re-establishing the CPS capacity to handle substantial fraud cases will require significant investment. What does the Treasury say about that? Perhaps the £25 million wasted on these proceedings might have funded the necessary reforms.

Lord Elystan-Morgan: My Lords, I join those noble Lords who have respectfully urged the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General to be wary of diminishing in any way at all the invaluable role of the jury in criminal trials. As one who has not had the opportunity of reading the report, I apologise beforehand if the matters I briefly raise are specifically covered.
	First, does the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-general accept that the court has a substantial role to play in a pre-trial review? We are all magnificent Solomons of judgment with the benefit of hindsight, but it is sometimes fairly easy, with intelligent foresight, to smell out the likely difficulties that will arise and thereby perhaps save a great deal of court time.
	Secondly, on the question of conspiracy to defraud, with all the difficulties and complexities that have surrounded this offence for a long time, had specific requests been made in this case for specific information on the factual basis of the prosecution case for count two? I know not; I ask the question rhetorically.

Report received.
	Clause 1 [The Assembly]:

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: My Lords, Amendment No. 1 is grouped with Amendments Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 10. The purpose of the amendments is to install the single transferable vote system—voting in proportionality. The topic was discussed at some length in Committee. I do not intend to debate this at great length, although it would be quite wrong, on Report, not to draw attention to the importance of ending up with what we regard as the best system of election to the Welsh Assembly. We are particularly exercised by the importance of the fairness of the voting system and the proportionality in the electoral system.
	Amendment No. 1 covers the possibility, at any rate, of an 80-member Assembly, elected by the single transferable vote. Amendment No. 2 specifies that members would be elected in multi-member constituencies. Amendment No. 3 deals with the situation in which two votes would not be cast—as in the Bill at present—but just one vote cast preferentially. Amendment No. 4 is consequential on the above amendments. Amendment No. 7 leaves out Clause 8, which will be necessary to achieve the objective of an STV system to elect members to the Welsh Assembly. Amendment No. 8 removes Clause 9 and inserts a new clause that specifies that each vote will use the single transferable vote system, which indicates voters' order of preference and eliminates prior choice. We shall come to that in Amendment No. 5, which we will debate after this group of amendments. Amendment No. 10 installs an 80-member Assembly elected by single transferable vote.
	These amendments eliminate the present additional member system of election to the Assembly and the system proposed by the Government as an alternative to the STV system recommended by the Richard commission, where the first-past-the-post system of election in constituencies and a regional top-up list apply as they do at the moment. Noble Lords will remember that we had a vote in Committee about whether candidates could stand in the same region as they stood in for a first-past-the-post election, which is the status quo. I think that was the only vote carried in Committee.
	This system overcomes the difficulties with the AMS system, whether carried out under the status quo or under the system proposed by the Government, because it means that there are not two classes of candidates. Everyone is voted to the National Assembly by the same system. There is no difference and no way to say, "This Member was elected by a system that makes him a second-class Member". Everyone has the equality of the same system. That is the benefit of the STV system. We debated the subject at considerable length in Committee, and I make no apologies for returning to it on Report. I beg to move.

Lord Trimble: My Lords, the core of these amendments refers to the single transferable vote system, proportional representation. As your Lordships may know, it is a subject in which on an earlier occasion I claimed a certain expertise. It has operated in Northern Ireland since 1973. I fought approximately 10 elections under the single transferable vote system, and, indeed, in one election was part of a very successful vote management arrangement whereby we maximised our results quite significantly and achieved many more seats than mere proportionality would have given us. Like all electoral systems, it can be manipulated.
	I appreciate that this matter was debated in Committee, and I shall try to avoid the temptation to speak at any length, but I want to make some points on which I hold very strong opinions—drawn from experience. I am not hostile to proportionality as such; I am quite content to see proportionality at district and regional level; but I am very strongly opposed to any attempt to have proportionality in another place.
	The great advantage of the first-past-the-post system is that it produces Governments, not coalitions. Coalitions are intrinsically weak and undemocratic, because they end up with decisions taken after an election by horse-trading between politicians rather than decisions taken by the electorate in the election. It is no small part of the economic and other success of this country that we have retained the capacity to have Governments able to govern. We sometimes do not like what they do, but that is much better than having coalitions, where decisions are not taken, issues are not faced and necessary changes do not occur. I could go on at length on that matter, but it is important that we limit proportionality to district and regional level.
	Then we have to choose what proportional system we are to adopt. I find it interesting that Liberal Democrats, who tend to be great advocates of European practice, do not draw the appropriate lesson. Do they have single transferable votes in Europe? No they do not. They have proportional systems, but your Lordships will know what those systems are, so I do not need to go into them. Indeed, one of those European proportional systems was adopted for Wales and Scotland and is now being criticised.
	Scotland, we are told, is now adopting STV for local government. It has now become the only place in the world that has ever voluntarily chosen STV. STV was imposed in the Republic of Ireland by this House—this Parliament—against the will of the people. STV was imposed in Northern Ireland by this Parliament against the will of the people. I think that the same was done in Malta. That is all. It is not a good system. In my criticism, I shall mention just a couple of points. It promotes fights within parties. In a multi-Member constituency, if your party has, say 30 to 40 per cent of the electorate, you would count yourself as having two quotas.

Lord Trimble: My Lords, the noble Lord is quite correct. There were two referenda, two attempts by the Irish Government—both under de Valera, I think—to go back to the first-past-the-post system. It is quite correct that on both occasions, the proposals failed because people did not want to go back to that system. I do not think that you can read into that a positive preference for STV against other proportional systems. My comment on STV having been imposed goes back to 1920, when it was introduced. I take the point that is made, but I do not think it affects my argument. Essentially, my point is about the negative effects of STV compare to other proportional systems.

Lord Trimble: My Lords, indeed we do. We have it at that level—I forgot about that in my summary of the matter. We have and have had STV at district council and regional level. I was drawing the distinction that it is undesirable at the parliamentary level. As for having it for the European Parliament, that tempts me to make comments about the nature of the European Parliament, its effectiveness and whether it is ever capable or likely to approach being capable of supporting or maintaining a Government. There is too much to say about that.
	I was making a point about how STV encourages fights within parties. If you have a multi-Member constituency with, say, five Members and you get 30 to 40 per cent of the vote, or think that you will, you have two quotas. The conventional wisdom is that you run two existing quotas plus one in such a situation, because you cannot make gains if you do not run an extra quota. For those three candidates, who know that two of them will certainly be elected and that one has only a chance of being elected, the most important thing is to be among the two who will certainly be elected. It is easier to persuade existing party members to vote for you rather than for another member of the party, rather than converting persons who are not part of your party's support to support you.
	You then get considerable fights within parties. Parties can make some efforts to control that but it is not easy, because the other thing that happens is that the STV gives the elected Member much greater independence vis-à-vis the party itself. There is a benefit to being out of line with the party and to taking an independent line, because you gather publicity as a result. There is a comparative penalty to being a loyal party member. This is bad for political parties and for the health of democracy. Our democracy depends on political parties. We do not elect Parliaments or bodies of independent members. That ceased to happen hundreds of years ago. If you undermine parties, you weaken our democratic process.
	The system also promotes parochialism. It becomes necessary for people to maintain their base and constantly to cultivate their grass roots. I can understand Liberal Democrats thinking that it is a good idea to do that, but that has impacts on what you do. One criticism that you might make of the Northern Ireland Assembly is that more than 80 per cent of the Members elected are also councillors. You dare not leave council under an STV system. In the Irish Republic, most TDs—I do not know the exact figure—are also councillors. I can hear something being muttered at the end of the Chamber. I shall take an intervention.

Lord Evans of Temple Guiting: My Lords, I remind noble Lords that we are on Report. We have been through Second Reading and Committee, in which we went into this sort of detail. I would be very grateful if the noble Lord could not be quite as discursive as he is being about the whole system but actually focus on the amendment, as we must on Report, otherwise we will be here all night and all tomorrow night as well.

Lord Trimble: My Lords, I appreciate the criticism, and I shall try to conclude my comments. I ask the House to forgive me because I did not have the opportunity to contribute earlier, and this is a subject on which I have some views.
	I shall not go into the issue of parochialism, but I understand why they abolished the system in the Republic of Ireland, because it produced a system where TDs stayed in the constituency and did not attend the Dail. It was recognised in the Irish Republic that it was having a very negative effect on accountability. Unfortunately, the promised legislation in the United Kingdom to end the dual mandate never surfaced, which is a great shame.
	I shall just make a last couple of points about another consequence of PR. Those who are starting off in politics in the STV system should try to ensure that their surnames begin with the letters A, B or C. There is a very strong alphabetical bias in this system. Again, I feel personally about that for obvious reasons. This is a very noted bias. I have also made the point that there is a very strong bias towards people being independent and continuing a career as an independent. It might be all right at local government, and it may not be too bad at regional level, but beyond that the effects of this system are really pernicious.

Lord Anderson of Swansea: My Lords, given the final remarks of the noble Lord and his useful experience of Ireland, perhaps I should declare an interest in that, as my surname begins with an A, I have benefited from this throughout my life. I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Llandudno, that in principle the architecture of a debating chamber should have an effect on consensus, or on the lack of it, but alas I have not noticed an effect on consensus in the Welsh Assembly arising from its particular architecture.
	There are a number of elements to the amendment; that is, the "80 Members", the "multi-member constituencies" and the STV. On the 80 Members, let us bear in mind that the amendment suggests that this should be the system immediately after the Bill is implemented. However, the view of the Speaker of the Assembly is that the present workload—and, presumably, with the extension under this Bill—does not warrant additional membership. Naturally there are complaints from Members of the Assembly that they are overburdened. But the person who sits in the chair and watches what goes on is convinced that the workload is such that, with changes in the way in which the Assembly operates, it can manage under the current responsibilities with the existing numbers. Perhaps, ultimately, we should move to 80 Members, but the case has certainly not been made out for it at present.
	I can be brief about the STV and multi-member constituencies because the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, has made much of that case. In my political experience, there has been a certain magnificent obsession of Liberals, then Liberal Democrats, with electoral systems. I recall years ago, John Pardoe, the economics spokesman, who would give a sea, a litany of ills of our economy and end by saying, "All these ills would be ended if only we had proportional representation". I am not sure that Liberal Democrat Peers opposite would go quite that far. But one thing is certain: in multi-member constituencies the valuable link between the Member and the constituency would be lost. For example, we used to have five Members on a regional basis in Wales. However, after a change in the electoral system for Members of the European Parliament, which was understandable because it was necessary as a result of European electoral law, we moved to having Wales as just one constituency. However hardworking those Members of the European Parliament are, I fear that some local attachment has gone. Fewer people now know who is their MEP. With the best will in the world, given the remoteness of Strasbourg and Brussels, it is difficult enough for MEPs to make a real impact. The new electoral system makes it more difficult.
	The noble Lord, Lord Trimble, has mentioned localism and the way in which it has an adverse effect on parties. We rehearsed some of those arguments in Committee. I will certainly not go through them now. We need to look very carefully at moving further along that road. To conclude, 80 Members may come; STV may come; but if it comes, let us at least be aware of some of the negative consequences which will certainly flow from it.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: My Lords, the fact that the coalition in the Scots Parliament has opted to have STV for local government elections has been mentioned. In preparing for those elections, certainly in the constituency where I live, the very problems, which the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, has mentioned, are being discovered even before those elections take place. I wonder very much how the electorate will react to this system. I do not think that at the moment it looks very happy.

Lord Elystan-Morgan: My Lords, with great humility and respect, I suggest that we may be discussing the wrong question. The question is not whether STV is perfect: it clearly is not. The question is not whether it is laden with complexities and difficulties: it is. The question is whether the situation that obtains at the moment, and has obtained since the Government of Wales Act 1998, can possibly be regarded as tolerable. The Labour Government are to be congratulated on their chivalry and sense of justice in seeing to it that what otherwise probably would be a Labour hegemony in Cardiff could somehow be avoided. They created a system in good faith and I do not doubt that that was the approach of all parties at the time. But the result is that a party which gained in a first-past-the-post vote some three-quarters of the seats in Wales and three times as many as all the other parties put together finds that, from time to time, it is impossible to carry out its functions as a government. In addition to that, on the second ballot, a tonnage of votes cast for the Labour Party is not reflected in the membership of any additional candidate. That, I respectfully submit, is a wholly intolerable situation. It may well be that that the Labour Party will say, "We will tolerate it for the moment", but it may well be too that the next few months and years will force it to a different conclusion.
	Parallel with those arguments is the question of membership. I believe wholeheartedly that a membership of 60 is much too small; 80 Members is the minimum number needed to do the job required of them. As the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Llandudno, has reminded us, the maximum number of Members available to staff a host of committees and to carry out other functions is 46. With great respect to the Presiding Officer, the noble Lord, Lord Elis-Thomas, who is one of the most fascinating political commentators Wales has produced for a long time, I do not of necessity equate his words with holy writ in this or any other matter. Let us consider the position of local government in Wales. All but six of the 22 county councils in Wales have well over 60 Members. No lengthening of hours or further sitting days can make up for that difficulty.
	As I have said, the Labour Party is to be congratulated on its chivalry in creating this system and on its integrity, but it would score very low marks in its anticipation of realpolitik. Although this Bill is a vehicle which can be used for that purpose, I have no doubt that it will not do so. But I prophesy that the time will come when the Labour Party will have to return to this matter again and again.

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: My Lords, I note what the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, and the Minister said. However, we are very familiar with the fact that the Assembly's system of election was decided by primary legislation; indeed, we are going to alter it by primary legislation here in both Houses of Parliament. So I cannot accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, that the second vote is a party vote therefore it is satisfactory for the party hierarchy to decide who will be elected. I can see no reason at all why an open list is not much preferable as far as political parties are concerned. Perhaps the political parties are worried that people within their own parties might rock the boat or they might be more focused and get down to some rather hard decisions when they are elected. Lo and behold, perhaps the electorate might rather like that.
	The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, said that secondary legislation could achieve what the amendment sought. That may be the case. He asks why we should be burdened. Well, we have done it before. We did it in the original Wales Bill and we are going to do it in this Bill by suggesting another system. Therefore, I have no compunction whatever about dividing the House on this issue.

Lord Roberts of Llandudno: My Lords, in the event of the death of a candidate at constituency level the whole regional list is suspended because you cannot total up the votes until you know which candidates have succeeded in each of the constituencies in that region. If the list is not complete in a region, the composition of the Assembly itself will not be known. We have to decide how we are going to fill that constituency vacancy. A candidate has died therefore the election is postponed.
	This happened in England during the previous election, when there was a delay of some weeks before the vacancy, which I believe was in Staffordshire, was filled. We consulted electoral officers to determine how quickly such a vacancy could be filled. It was suggested that you really needed 35 days to nominate a new candidate, print the ballot papers and distribute them, especially to postal voters, before polling day. It was suggested that 35 days would be the ideal. Of course, 35 days is 35 days in limbo for the region and possibly for the Assembly, so we are trying to take one week off those 35 days and make it 28 days. I think possibly it would work, and from the death of a candidate to the election all the procedures could be filled in 28 days. That is the reason for the amendment and for the period that we have specified in the amendment. I beg to move.

Lord Roberts of Llandudno: My Lords, we have altered the amendment, and the Marshalled List should read "28 days" and not "21 days".

Lord Norton of Louth: My Lords, I reinforce the argument put forward by my noble friend on the Front Bench. There are three points to be deployed in respect of what has been said. First, as my noble friend said, this is the wrong Bill in which to incorporate such a provision. It should be a matter of public policy nationally and therefore should be the subject of national debate.
	Secondly, the amendment does not address the problem that the noble Lord mentioned. There is a question of how to involve young people in politics and there is a much wider discussion to be had about how to get people more engaged with political activity. But I do not think that this is the best route for that; it is a far more complex problem than this proposal suggests.
	The third problem with the amendment at this stage is that we have heard nothing new compared with what was raised in Grand Committee. We responded to the arguments put forward then, and there is no value-added element in the amendment at this stage. The noble Lord says that 16 year-olds can marry and can become boy soldiers. But that is not the case in the sense that they do not choose to be boy soldiers. It is the Army that chooses them, if they apply, and so there is a sifting process before they can exercise the benefits or positions that we permit them to have. On the other hand, voting is an absolute power that can be exercised directly. A significant qualitative distinction can be drawn between the two and therefore there is no clear argument for the proposal.
	The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, was right: when the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18, one argument for doing so was that it would get young people more engaged in political activity. However, that has not been the consequence, and I do not see why it necessarily follows that further lowering the voting age to 16 would have the desired effect. Therefore, like my noble friend, I see no virtue in the amendment at this stage.

Lord Evans of Temple Guiting: My Lords, I can only repeat the Government's position, which we made absolutely clear in Grand Committee. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, that this Bill is not an appropriate vehicle for reducing the voting age in any British election. While the Government welcome the recommendations of the Power inquiry and its contribution to the debate on democracy in Britain, and while careful consideration will be given to the report and findings, as I said, this is not the vehicle for those concerns. We cannot simply slot in a provision lowering the voting age just for Wales, as my noble friend Lady Gale rightly said when we last debated this amendment. As a number of noble Lords have said, this issue must be debated on a UK-wide basis. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, said, is almost precisely the same one as we considered and discussed fully in Committee.

Lord Roberts of Llandudno: My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and I thank noble Lords for expressing their views in this short debate. I believe that there is still a strong argument for lowering the voting age from 18 to 16, not least because my noble friend Lord Mar and Kellie said that people would not necessarily vote in the year in which they turned 16. By the time they come to cast a vote they could be 17 or 18 years old. One of my friends on the Front Bench has said that he was 24 years old before he was able to exercise his right to vote. Time elapses between registering to vote and an election taking place.
	I am interested to know that there is, at least, a willingness to discuss this further from all sections of the House and to look at it in a UK-wide context. The nations of Scotland, England, Northern Ireland and Wales will all be able to partake in a discussion and move forward at the same time. I would very much like to know that there will be such a debate. With that hope in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: My Lords, under this amendment we consider the Assembly commission. It is important to recognise why we have tabled this very simple amendment. Clause 27 on page 17 of the Bill sets out what the Assembly commission is all about. It says that there will be an Assembly commission and that,
	"The members of the Assembly Commission are to be— (a) the Presiding Officer, and (b) four other Assembly members".
	Standing orders also come into play. The Assembly commission has many responsibilities. It is very important that it is independent of the Assembly Government as it will deal with, for example, the payment of civil servants. Schedule 2 refers to many responsibilities of the Assembly commission.
	In Scotland it was felt that there should be all-party participation in such a body. When one examines the responsibilities of the commission, it becomes quite clear that it is desirable to have overall representation on it; so when we say,
	"not belonging to the same political group",
	the four other members to whom we refer would be in that category and would be from different political parties. Amendment No. 12 is tabled by the Opposition and is very similar to this amendment. I beg to move.

Lord Henley: My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Livsey, has made clear, we have tabled a similar amendment, Amendment No. 12. I do not see much difference between the two amendments. If the noble Lord wishes to press his amendment—his amendment comes before ours as it refers to line 27 whereas ours refers to line 29—and if he were successful in having that put on the face of the Bill, we would not move our amendment. Both amendments are directed at the same purpose, which is ensuring that the Assembly commission should remain fairly non-party political.
	As the noble Lord made perfectly clear, the Assembly commission's duties, which are set out in the Bill and in the Explanatory Notes, are essentially non-political duties; they are practical duties relating to the running of the commission. Therefore, we think it is right that as far as possible as many different parties should be represented on it. For that reason, it might be that our amendment is marginally better because it states:
	"so far as is practicable".
	But it is only marginally better, and we are prepared to support the amendment standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Livsey, if he wishes to press it to a vote at the appropriate moment.

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Henley, for his support. As he said, there is very little difference between my amendment and his. We believe that it is necessary to do this. I understand what the Minister said, and there is no doubt that at the moment the situation is very equable and people are getting on and are ensuring that there is a Member from each party. I think it is—na-ve is probably the wrong word to use, but who knows what will happen in future as far as the commission is concerned? I think it is appropriate to divide the House on this and put into place what is a fact already. It is right and proper to have Members of different political parties on the commission by right. Therefore, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Resolved in the affirmative, and amendment agreed to accordingly.
	[Amendment No. 12 not moved.]
	Clause 29 [Composition of committees]:

Lord Henley: My Lords, Amendment No. 13 relates to Clause 29, which deals with the composition of any committees set up by the National Assembly of Wales. We debated this issue at considerable length in Committee and I do not intend to repeat all the arguments put forward at that stage. I can briefly sum up our objections—I imagine the same will be true of the Liberal Democrats' objections, but we will hear from the noble Lord, Lord Livsey, in due course. They are, first, that Clause 29 is overly prescriptive and, secondly—and I think more importantly—that it is a fix to give the largest party, which happens to be the Government party, a Labour Party, an unfair share of the membership of the committees that are set up.
	In Committee we put forward all the arguments that the, what I described as, "overly prescriptive" nature of Clause 29, which brings in the d'Hondt mechanism for counting committees, would give an undue proportion of members to the ruling party, the Labour Party. I set out the figures showing how the relatively small-sized committees—and they have to be relatively small, bearing in mind the size of the Assembly—meant that d'Hondt provided an even more unfair system than anything else. We feel that this is overly prescriptive and that possibly the best way to deal with the matter is to leave out Clause 29 and leave it to the Assembly to decide on the composition of its committees.
	However, if we are going to have a Clause 29, we feel that it should be a much simpler version of affairs. The best way of dealing with that is to leave in subsection (1), remove subsections (2) to (9)—virtually the whole of the clause—and replace them with the words in Amendment No. 13:
	"The standing orders shall include provision for ensuring that in apportioning members to committees and sub-committees regard is had to the balance of political parties represented in the Assembly".
	It is as simple as that, and we can leave it to the Assembly to decide what it does.
	In Committee—it is right that I should say something about this—the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, spoke for the Government and defended Clause 29 and the d'Hondt principle. He said:
	"So the d'Hondt principle is simply a formula that gets as close as possible to the appropriate levels of fairness".
	I do not accept that. I think that the Members themselves can get a much better level of fairness than D'Hondt gives us, as we know from all the figures that d'Hondt will provide with the relatively small size of committees.
	The Minister went on to say that Clause 29 was, in effect, merely a voluntary clause and did not bind the Assembly. He said:
	"The formula is there against the eventuality of deadlock. I do not see why this is an intrusion on the Assembly".
	Further, he said:
	"I emphasise that it is not dictation. It does not dictate to the Assembly. If the Assembly can reach agreement on its committees, the d'Hondt formula . . . does not come into play".—[Official Report, 19/4/06; col. 1135-37.]
	All the noble Lord can suggest in favour of the argument that the clause is voluntary is subsection (8), which says that the Assembly may disapply subsections (2) to (7) but only if it has a two-thirds majority for so doing. In other words, there is a very comfortable blocking minority for the Labour Party preventing that applying and allowing it to go on using d'Hondt which gives it an unfair advantage.
	As I said, I found extraordinary the Minister's defence in Committee and his claims that the clause was in effect voluntary. I invited him in my closing remarks to be good enough to look carefully at everything that he had said, which no doubt he has done, especially about the voluntary nature of the provision, and have a word with officials to see whether they could draft amendments to bring the clause into line with what he said.
	No doubt the Minister has done that and will tell us about those discussions, but I regret that he has not come forward with any amendments intended to do what we and the Liberal Democrats seek to do. Therefore, I have brought my amendments back and I certainly intend to press them in this case unless the Government can give a very clear response to our real concerns about the membership and composition of the committees. I beg to move.

Resolved in the affirmative, and amendment agreed to accordingly.
	[Amendment No. 14 not moved.]
	Clause 30 [Audit Committee]:

Baroness Noakes: moved Amendments Nos. 16:
	Page 19, line 36, leave out "Audit" and insert "Accounts" .
	Page 19, line 38, leave out "Audit" and insert "Accounts"
	Page 19, line 45, leave out "Audit" and insert "Accounts"
	On Question, amendments agreed to.
	Clause 31 [Standing orders]:

Baroness Noakes: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 19, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 74. With these amendments, I am returning to issues we debated in Committee about the extent to which certain budgets can be protected against the Executive.
	Amendment No. 19 would add a new subsection (1A) to Clause 31, which says that the standing orders which are the subject of Clause 31 have to include provision for the scrutiny and approval of the budgets of five named persons or bodies: the Assembly Commission, the Auditor General, the Public Services Ombudsman, the Children's Commissioner and the Commissioner for Older People in Wales. It also says that other bodies can be added to this list.
	I do not think that Amendment No. 19 itself is very controversial; it merely specifies some matters that will, for the most part, be covered by the standing orders to be drawn up under Clause 31. We know that the audit committee will deal with the Auditor General's estimates, as set out in paragraph 12 of Schedule 8. The Minister told us in Committee that standing orders would have to deal with estimates for the Assembly Commission and for the Public Services Ombudsman; that is dealt with in paragraph 85(12) of Schedule 10.
	The addition of the two commissioners—for children and older people—raises slightly different issues. The Care Standards Act 2000 requires the Children's Commissioner's estimates to be considered by the executive committee and laid before the Assembly. Paragraph 28 of Schedule 11 to the Bill currently passes this function to Ministers, thus diminishing the role of the Assembly.
	The Commissioner for Older People in Wales is covered by a Bill which is before another place, but that has the financial estimates being put before the Assembly Cabinet. My amendment is to this extent designed to ensure that there are proper scrutiny provisions so that Assembly Members can oversee the funding of the commissioners.
	I am aware from our debate in Committee that the Government want to pursue a non-departmental public body model for the two commissioners, which gives Parliament only a very indirect say in the funding that goes to such bodies. That model works very well all the time that the Government give the bodies enough money to allow them to pursue their functions properly. But when the Government impose a financial squeeze—which often happens, whether for good reasons or bad—Parliament, in the case of the UK, or the Assembly in Wales, would be left without an effective voice. I believe that the Government's preferred solution is in contrast to the position for the equivalent commissioner for children in Scotland, where I understand that funding is determined by the Scottish Parliament, not Ministers.
	The meat of Amendment No. 19 is found in Amendment No. 74, which amends Clause 124, the clause that provides that annual budget motions have to be presented by a Welsh Minister. At present, the Bill would allow that budget motion to include amounts which did not include enough to allow the various persons listed in Amendment No. 19 to do their work effectively. My Amendment No. 74 would in effect protect those budgets once they had been scrutinised and approved.
	In Committee, the Minister said that if Assembly Members do not like what Welsh Ministers put forward, they can reject the budget motion. But that is using a sledgehammer to crack a nut; it is not practical, everyday politics. However, there is a practical, everyday reason to ensure that important parts of the constitutional arrangements for Wales are properly funded. That is why my Amendment No. 74 says that the annual budget motion has to include the amounts approved under proposed subsection (1A) of Clause 31, as inserted by my Amendment No. 19.
	The Minister's response in Committee was surprising in the light of the Latimer House guidelines, which followed an initiative by Commonwealth heads of government in 1998. The guidelines state quite clearly:
	"An all-party committee of Members of Parliament should review and administer Parliament's budget which should not be subject to amendment by the executive".
	This clearly applies to the funding of the Assembly Commission and, I argue, must also apply to constitutional officers such as the Auditor General and the ombudsman. Will the Minister say why the Government have chosen to ignore the Latimer House guidelines in the Bill?
	We believe that there should be no room in the annual budget motion for the Executive to decide to put less money than in the budgets for bodies. The budget motion must fund them to the extent of approved budgets. That is a matter of principle. I beg to move.

Lord Evans of Temple Guiting: My Lords, we appreciate the aim of the noble Baroness in tabling Amendments Nos. 19 and 74 to ensure that there is proper and informed democratic control by the Assembly of the budgets for the persons and bodies listed in the amendment. I reassure the noble Baroness, however, that these amendments are not necessary.
	On Amendment No. 19, adequate pre-budget scrutiny procedures for the Auditor General and the ombudsman are already provided for in the Bill. The Auditor General's estimate will go to the Assembly's Audit Committee, as it does now, by virtue of paragraph 12 of Schedule 8 to the Bill. The Audit Committee will receive that estimate at least five months before the beginning of each financial year. The committee must examine it and then lay it before the Assembly; it may modify the estimate before doing so, but only after prior consultation with the Auditor General.
	The estimate procedure for the Public Services Ombudsman is set out in paragraph 15 of Schedule 1 to the Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act 2005 as amended by paragraph 85(12) of Schedule 10 to this Bill. Under that procedure the ombudsman's estimate will go to one of the Assembly's committees, which the Bill requires to be specified in Standing Orders. The procedure is otherwise identical to that for the Auditor General's estimate. The committee will receive the estimate by 1 November prior to the relevant financial year. They must then examine it and lay it before the Assembly. Again, they can propose modifications, subject to prior consultation with the ombudsman. The Bill does not specify any particular procedure for scrutiny of the Assembly Commission's budget. However, it is open to the Assembly in formulating its new standing orders to provide for an estimate, or pre-budget procedure for the Assembly Commission, should it choose to do so. That is, rightly, a matter for the Assembly.
	Turning to the Children's and Older People's Commissioners, as discussed in Committee, the mechanism specified in the Bill is the same in principle as the mechanism already established for the Children's Commissioner. The splitting of the legislature from the executive will formalise and clarify the Assembly's role in scrutinising the Welsh Ministers. As part of that role, Assembly Members will have the power to scrutinise the Welsh Ministers' budget. They will be aided in scrutinising the part of it that relates to the Children's Commissioner by the provision of an estimate, as provided for in paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 to the Care Standards Act. Similarly, paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the Commissioner for Older People (Wales) Bill will provide for the Assembly to be aided in its scrutiny of the part of the Welsh Ministers' budget that relates to the commissioner by the provision of an estimate. If Assembly Members are not satisfied that the commissioner is receiving adequate funding, they will be able to hold the Welsh Ministers to account, thus ensuring that there is proper and effective political and democratic accountability.
	Amendment No. 74 would require Welsh Ministers to include in the annual budget motion those amounts which have been approved by the Assembly for the Assembly Commission, the Auditor General, the ombudsman, and the Children's and Older People's Commissioners during the pre-budget scrutiny process that would be imposed on standing orders by Amendment No. 19. It is a key responsibility of the Welsh Assembly Government to plan and put forward a budget to deliver the commitments it was elected on, and to maximise the benefits of utilising those resources on behalf of the taxpayer. Limiting the discretion of the elected Government to do that runs counter to our very system of government.
	With great respect, we think this amendment goes too far by allowing the estimates laid before the Assembly in respect of those persons and bodies to dictate the content of the annual budget motion. In the Government's view, the proper relationship is that the estimates are provided to aid the Assembly's scrutiny of the annual budget motion moved by the Welsh Ministers under Clause 124(1). It is a well established constitutional principle that it is for the executive to request resources and for the legislature to consider whether or not to authorise them.
	In moving an annual budget motion on behalf of themselves, the Assembly Commission, the Auditor General and the ombudsman, the Welsh Ministers are inviting the Assembly to allocate a finite amount of resources in the annual budget motion. If, having had the benefit of considering the estimates for the persons and bodies listed above, the Assembly is not satisfied with the amounts proposed in the annual budget motion, it can reject it. On that basis we believe the Bill already provides a proper and effective mechanism for informed, democratic control.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked about the Latimer House guidelines. The Government are aware that clause 6 of part 6 of the principles of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association provides that,
	"An all party committee of Members of Parliament should review and administer Parliament's budget which should not be subject to amendment by the Executive".
	The Assembly's Standing Order Committee has agreed the principle that, where appropriate, the committee should take account of those guidelines in drawing up its recommendations for the Assembly's new standing orders. The Government do not believe that the mechanism under the Bill would be in any way inconsistent with the Latimer House guidelines. Ultimately the budget for the Assembly Commission is voted on by the Assembly itself as a separate and distinct part of the annual budget motion. If the Assembly is not satisfied that the amount proposed in that motion is sufficient for the commission, the Welsh Ministers risk losing their budget motion. The Assembly has the right to keep rejecting the annual budget motion until it is satisfied that the amount allocated to the commission is sufficient.
	I hope, with the explanation I have given, that the noble Baroness will be able to withdraw the amendments.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, when the Bill becomes an Act, it will increase the potential primary legislative powers of the Assembly, but what would be the point of an amendment that took away from the people of Wales a voice in the Cabinet? A great deal of legislation is not devolved to the Assembly, even if the whole of Part 4 is in operation. Many essential public issues which are debated in Cabinet and are subject to the decision of the United Kingdom legislature, would have no specific Welsh contribution. I cannot see the gain to the people of Wales in that. We are all in favour of those proposals which emphasise the enhanced potential powers of the Assembly and the move to greater devolution, but I cannot see why on crucial issues—defence, economic, fiscal and monetary policy, immigration, civil and criminal law, none of which is a devolved matter—the Secretary of State for Wales should have no contribution in the Cabinet on behalf of the people of Wales. I cannot see how that would serve the interests of the people of Wales and I hope that the noble Lord will recognise that and withdraw his amendment.

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: My Lords, this amendment comes from the same source. The Bill allows the Secretary of State the discretion to decide whether to consult the Assembly about Bills in the UK Government's legislative programme. It seems inappropriate for the Secretary of State to decide whether the Assembly should be consulted; that should be a matter for the Assembly itself. We feel quite strongly about that. The amendment transfers the power to determine whether consultation with the Assembly is unnecessary from the Secretary of State to the Presiding Officer in this instance. The Assembly should be the locus of power in this respect. It would enhance the Assembly's role. I beg to move.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for the way in which he moved the amendment, but he will recognise that the provisions contained in Clause 33 are similar to those contained in Section 31 of the Government of Wales Act 1998, which are unique to the devolution settlement for Wales. The arrangements already in place ensure that the Assembly has an opportunity to express views on proposed legislation that affects its responsibilities.
	Under the devolution settlement established by the 1998 Act, it has been essential for the Assembly to be consulted on the UK Government's legislative programme, because primary legislation has in many instances conferred new executive functions on the Assembly. In addition, Bills in this current Session have included framework provisions, giving the Assembly wider and more permissive powers to determine the detail of how the provisions should be implemented in Wales—an example is the NHS Redress Bill, which has recently been scrutinised and passed by this House.
	Under this Bill, the consultation provision will continue to be important, as Parliament will still enact primary legislation that affects the Assembly's responsibilities. That is why the provision has been carried forward; to enable these successful contacts to continue.
	The existing arrangements have worked well to date, and there is no reason why they should not continue to do so.  The provision gives the Secretary of State some discretion, because there is a need for the Assembly to be able to express a view only on areas where it has some responsibility. Bills on matters for which the Assembly clearly has no responsibility, such as an Armed Forces Bill, can be excluded from the consultation. But omission from the Secretary of State's consultation does not prevent Assembly Members expressing views on other Bills included in the Queen's Speech during the Assembly debate on the legislative programme—in which, of course, the Secretary of State takes part. I think that that is a valued power for the Assembly.
	The provision concerns the legislative programme of the UK Government. The Bill rightly provides that it is for the UK Government to determine what consultation on their own programme should be undertaken. The Assembly or the Presiding Officer will not be in a position to determine what Bills are relevant to its responsibilities and, therefore, what consultation is appropriate. This could well result in a situation where the consultation becomes far less effective because, instead of concentrating on Bills that relate to the Assembly's responsibilities, the Assembly would in practice have to require consultation on pretty well everything.

Lord Kingsland: My Lords, I apologise to the Minister for not tabling this amendment in Committee. The truth is that I had not thought about it at Committee stage. It is a problem that occurred to me only as a result of rereading the Bill, as is my habit, between Committee stage and Report.
	The amendment, as is clear from the Marshalled List, seeks to disapply subsection (3) of Clause 37 to any matter under Clause 84(1). Clause 84(1), headed "Construction of references to Ministers and departments", reads as follows, in so far as it is relevant to the amendment:
	"So far as may be necessary for the purpose or in consequence of the exercise of any functions of the Welsh Ministers, the First Minister or the Counsel General, any reference in any enactment or other document to—
	(a) a Minister of the Crown . . . is to be construed as being or including a reference to the Welsh Ministers".
	In other words, where a Welsh Minister is acting in the place of a Minister of the Crown, the expression "Minister of the Crown" is considered to apply to Welsh Ministers. In Clause 37, entitled "Power to call", which I seek to amend, subsection (1) states:
	"Subject as follows, the Assembly may require any person—
	(a) to attend Assembly proceedings for the purpose of giving evidence, or
	(b) to produce for the purposes of the Assembly (or a committee of the Assembly or a sub-committee of such a committee) documents in the possession, or under the control, of the person,
	concerning any matter relevant to the exercise by the Welsh Ministers of any of their functions".
	Perhaps I may move on and draw your Lordships attention to subsection (3), which reads:
	"The Assembly may not impose a requirement under subsection (1) on a person who—
	(a) is or has been a Minister of the Crown".
	I think your Lordships will readily see my concern. It appears that in so far as a Welsh Minister is acting in Wales on Welsh matters as a Minister of the Crown, rather than as a Welsh Minister, he or she cannot be compelled to appear in front of the Assembly, or any committee of the Assembly, and cannot be compelled to produce any documents that might be relevant to that appearance or for any other reason. If that is so, would I not be right in concluding that this is potentially a serious gap in the way in which the Welsh Assembly is capable of controlling the Executive? I beg to move.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Livsey, may refer to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, as probing, but by heaven it terrifies me, if I follow the dire implications that the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, has read into this conjunction between Clauses 37 and 84. I want to disabuse him, I hope, of any justification for his fears. I would first like to explain our intent in how the Bill is constructed. Secondly, I hope to prove that that intent is fulfilled in the clauses. We had some anxiety about this amendment, as I was not quite clear on the nature of the worries of the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland. I now understand them. Whether I have understood them sufficiently to assuage them is a different matter altogether, but I will do my best.
	The simple fact is that the Assembly will be able to summon the First Minister, the Welsh Ministers, deputy Welsh Ministers and the Counsel General. They are all subject to Clause 37. Ministers of the UK Government and their civil servants, or former UK Government Ministers, or civil servants working for the UK Government, cannot be summoned to be questioned about the exercise of their functions because that is properly the role of this Parliament. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, agrees with me there. If the intent behind his amendment is to guarantee that such Ministers can be summoned before the Welsh Assembly, I have reservations about that and would express them very strongly. However, I do not think that that is his intent.
	It will be perfectly possible for the Assembly to invite any UK Ministers or their civil servants to attend Assembly committee proceedings voluntarily; in fact, it would be the normal expectation that people would voluntarily attend Assembly proceedings and produce information requested by the Assembly. Such requests would undoubtedly be entirely reasonable. It is proper that those in positions of public responsibility respond to reasonable requests, but that would be voluntary; there is no power to summon. The power to summon relates to the Welsh Ministers, the Welsh Executive.
	There is no connection between Clause 37 and Clause 84, to which the amendment refers. Clause 84 does not convert references to Ministers of the Crown elsewhere in the Bill into references to the Welsh Ministers. Clause 84 simply ensures that where functions have been transferred to the Welsh Ministers, references to Ministers of the Crown, such as a Secretary of State, in the relevant legislation or any other documents are read as references to the Welsh Ministers, but only so far as may be necessary for the exercise of those functions by the Welsh Ministers. Clause 84 is equivalent to Section 43 of the Government of Wales Act 1998, which also produced this result.
	All that we are guaranteeing is that where it is relevant, appropriate and accurate that the legislation should refer to Welsh Ministers, the concept of Ministers in the legislation refers to the Welsh Ministers. What it does not do is subject United Kingdom Ministers to the control of the Assembly in the same way that Welsh Ministers clearly are. Welsh Ministers and the Welsh Executive are answerable to the Assembly, but clearly UK Ministers are not directly answerable to it.

Lord Davidson of Glen Clova: My Lords, may I say in my maiden speech, and as I come from the perhaps more adversarial reaches of the Scots Bar, what a pleasure it has been to experience the warmth of the welcome that one receives in this House? I take the opportunity to note the helpfulness and courtesy that I have received from the officials and staff in this House. This has made the translation from the Scottish courts to Advocate-General for Scotland far easier than I had anticipated. In presenting an order that deals with a natural force that flows majestically from Scotland to England, may I say immediately that I intend no metaphor for the office of Advocate-General for Scotland?
	Salmon and freshwater fisheries are an important commercial and recreational asset, and it is important that the legislation dealing with them should be clear and effective. It may be helpful to your Lordships if I briefly set out the background to this order. It is sensible, and has long been the practice, for legislation dealing with salmon and freshwater fishery matters to set up a general framework and to enable discrete provision to be made within that framework for the particular circumstances of particular rivers. A "river" in this context means the entire catchment area of that river and its tributaries.
	Prior to devolution, this caused difficulty only in relation to the border rivers—the Tweed and the Border Esk—which of course run through two different legal jurisdictions. Prior to 1857—just the other day—it was agreed that, although the lower reaches of the Tweed and some of its major tributaries lie in England, Scots law should nonetheless apply in relation to that river. Accordingly, historically, the salmon and freshwater fisheries legislation in force in relation to the Tweed, including those parts which are situated in England, has been Scots law, notably the Tweed Acts of 1857 to 1969. Other Scottish primary legislation relating to salmon and freshwater fishing has also routinely been applied to those parts of the Tweed which lie outside Scotland. Similarly, the River Esk catchment area is governed under English law, and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has the responsibility for legislation governing that river.
	With devolution, that convenient arrangement could not continue because, although fishing in rivers is a devolved matter, the Scottish Parliament could not legislate for the parts of the Tweed outside Scotland, and it would be inappropriate for the UK Parliament to legislate, without the approval of the Scottish Parliament, for those parts of the Border Esk outside England. Section 111 of the Scotland Act 1998 provides that Her Majesty may, by Order in Council, make provision for or in connection with the conservation, management and exploitation of salmon, trout, eels and freshwater fish in the border rivers. By virtue of Section 115 and Schedule 7, any such order requires to be approved by both Houses of this Parliament and by the Scottish Parliament.
	While Section 111 would, in theory, permit any regime to be put in place in the border rivers, the Scottish Executive, Defra and those currently charged with the management of fisheries in the River Tweed—the River Tweed Council—are all agreed that the pre-devolution arrangements should be retained and that the legislation in relation to the River Tweed should continue broadly to correspond to the legislation in force in Scotland.
	The objective of this order, therefore, is to provide a clear, up-to-date legal framework for the conservation, management and exploitation of salmon and freshwater fisheries in the River Tweed district. While the general provisions of the order largely reflect the consolidation in 2003 of the general Scottish legislation on salmon and freshwater fisheries, the order is not a consolidation exercise, and the opportunity has been taken to review and modernise those areas where there has always been separate provision for the Tweed. The River Tweed Council has been fully consulted about these proposals and it is content with them.
	I trust it may assist noble Lords if I explain some of the changes and ameliorations. First, the order updates the administration of salmon and freshwater fisheries management in the Tweed, including election and operating rules for the River Tweed Commission. Under previous regimes, every proprietor of a specified salmon fishery in the Tweed was a commissioner and was entitled to vote to elect certain of his fellow commissioners to serve on the River Tweed Council. That seemed unnecessarily complicated. The order therefore removes the River Tweed Council as an entity and replaces it with the River Tweed Commission. Under the order, not every proprietor of a specified fishery will be a commissioner, but he or she will continue to have a vote. Only those elected to represent their fellow proprietors will become commissioners. The definition of "proprietor" is clarified in the order.
	Secondly, the limits of the Tweed district and the estuary have been defined. The geographical extent of what is described in the order as the "Tweed district" has been much amended since the Tweed Fisheries Act 1857. The end result of those amendments is that, for the purposes of the administration of fisheries, "The Tweed" has since 1863 included not only the river of that name but also all the other rivers flowing into the sea between the border between the local authority areas of East Lothian and the Scottish Borders, in the north, and the Holy Island fisheries, in the south. The order defines the district so that it can readily be drawn on a map.
	Thirdly, the definitions of methods of fishing have been brought largely into line with those provided in the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 2003. However, in some cases the opportunity has been taken to go further. For example, the definition of "rod and line" has been amended to prohibit catching fish by foul hooking, and the use of anything other than a landing net as an auxiliary to the taking of fish by angling has been prohibited.
	Fourthly, in relation to enforcement of the legislation, the modernised provisions in relation to enforcement, which were included in the Scottish consolidation on the recommendation of the Scottish Law Commission, have been incorporated into the order. It has been clarified that, in relation to any offence committed in the Tweed district, bailiffs may cross from the Tweed district into adjoining districts, including Environment Agency areas. Reciprocal arrangements for bailiffs from other salmon fishery districts or from the Environment Agency have also been clarified.
	Finally, power to make subordinate legislation under this order is conferred on the Scottish Ministers. That will enable matters such as annual and weekly close times, provisions as to baits and lures, and any necessary salmon conservation orders, to be dealt with without the requirement for further Orders in Council under the Scotland Act.
	I hope that noble Lords may have found this explanation helpful and a useful addition to the information contained in the order and the supplementary material. If there are further matters on which your Lordships would wish further detail, I will endeavour to deal with those either by oral or written answer. I suggest that the proposals in the order are a sensible and necessary use of Section 111 of the Scotland Act, and I commend them to the House. I beg to move.
	Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 25 May be approved [29th Report from the Joint Committee].—(Lord Davidson of Glen Clova.)

Lord Maclennan of Rogart: My Lords, it gives me enormous pleasure to join the noble Duke in welcoming the noble and learned Lord, Lord Davidson of Glen Clova, to his office and especially to this House and to have listened to his interesting exposition of not entirely transparent legislation. He will bring to his task considerable experience of the law and of other matters, which will enable us to enjoy a direct understanding of the complexities which it will be his task to unravel for us. His appearance tonight has commanded great interest, and we welcome him.
	I have a few questions to raise in addition to the remarks of the noble Duke. I confess that I did not find the provided Explanatory Memorandum entirely clear on the extent of the operation of the law. The purpose of the order is clear. It seeks to unify the administration and management of the fisheries. That makes enormous sense. As I understand it, however, the Scotland Act provided for the laying of orders related to the border rivers: the Tweed and the Esk. On the face of it, this goes beyond that. The Tweed district is being provided for, and however sensible that may be in terms of unifying management, we must be satisfied that the legal basis for this is as suggested.
	The Explanatory Memorandum states:
	"This is a definition of an area larger than that of the River Tweed".
	It then states that this was "envisaged by the Scotland Act". I found that a little hard to understand. It did not seem to conform with the plain meaning of the Act, which referred to the border rivers. I have no doubt, however, that that matter can be elucidated further.
	The noble Duke properly referred to the importance of the fisheries to the anglers, visitors and tourists. But there are probably local fisherman used to fishing with methods other than rod and line. There is some provision for that in the use of the net and cobble, but I would like to know what consultations took place, and whether the Government were involved in consultation or relied on other bodies to carry out these consultations with other fisheries' interests.
	Article 74 of the order, "Power of Commission to prosecute in England and Wales", applies only to England and Wales. I assume—I hope that I can be reassured on this point—that the case that will be taken by the commission will be subject to the order and that the order amends English law which would otherwise be applicable. There have been, and no doubt still are, substantial differences between Scots and English law on salmon and freshwater fishery matters. I assume that these English differences will not be invoked in the case of actions brought under Part 5 of the order. Otherwise, I welcome the purposes behind the order and hope that it will make easier the task of managing these important fisheries.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: My Lords, I am particularly glad to welcome the noble and learned Lord to his place and to hear his maiden speech. I live only 15 miles south of the foot of Glen Clova and so he is indeed from time to time a neighbour. It is extremely nice to see him in his place.
	I know that he is an extremely distinguished member of the Scots Bar, and I am sure the House welcomes somebody of his ability in what experiences tells me is an important role under the Scotland Act. It is extremely important that United Kingdom legislation which applies to Scotland, or which has impact on Scotland, is well drafted. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will in a good position to look at all these Bills before they come to us and ensure that there are no holes which we can spot and draw to the Government's attention.
	I did not think that I had any questions to ask the noble and learned Lord, but there are two and they are probably very simple for him to answer. The first relates to what the noble Lord, Lord Maclennan, was saying. How will it be decided whether to prosecute somebody under Scots or English law for a given offence? Is that a matter of the geography of where the offence is committed? Can it be committed in the middle of the Tweed, where it might be difficult to know which side the offence was on? I wondered how that worked. I am sure it has been well thought out, but it would be interesting to know.
	The other question was also perhaps hinted at by the noble Lord, Lord Maclennan. Will you be allowed to guddle a trout; that is, catch it by tickling its tummy? A friend of mine who lives in the Tweed catchment area tells me that the authorities currently pay attention to small trout right at the top of tributaries, miles away from the Tweed. No doubt they will continue to do so under the order. The noble Lord, Lord Maclennan, said that there would be local people accustomed to fishing in some small burn which is a tributary to the Tweed.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: No!

The Earl of Mar and Kellie: My Lords, I, too, welcome the noble and learned Lord to this House and to his new position. I welcome him to the Scottish lobby in this House and hope that we will hear more from him in our Scottish discussions.
	Like my noble friend Lord Maclennan, the Explanatory Memorandum gave me the impression that this was just a consolidation measure. But the noble and learned Lord has made certain that we understand that it is not just a consolidation measure, although I am certain that some aspects are consolidatory.
	I declare an interest as a netting rights proprietor on the River Forth in the Clackmannanshire, Falkirk and Stirling district, and I shall come back to an issue on that. First, I note that it will be Scottish Ministers who legislate about the River Tweed, and I am content about that. At a trivial level on the subject of prosecution, I notice that, should an offender be taken to court, if it is in England it will be before a JP but, if it is in Scotland, it will be before the sheriff. I would probably rather appear before a JP because of the weight that the sheriff court carries.
	One point on which I have a question—I appreciate that I did not give notice of this and so I am very happy to have a written answer—is the handing in of netting rights. It is certainly an issue on the Forth and I guess that that may well be the case on the Tweed. At present, if it comes to it, I want to hand in some of my netting rights, but my salmon fishery board is not certain how to facilitate that. I wonder whether there are any guidelines in the Act or, indeed, whether this issue has been thought about. Clearly, if someone seeks to extinguish netting rights, that will have implications for funding. In the case of the Tweed, it will be the River Tweed Commission. Obviously, if netting rights cease to exist, there will be less assessment and that will affect the financing of the commission. I am perfectly content to hear about that in writing; otherwise, I wish the order well.

Consideration of amendments on Report resumed.
	Clause 42 [Defamation]:

Lord Crickhowell: My Lords, on the second day in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Temple-Morris, moved an amendment concerning the future of the Arts Council of Wales and the Assembly's right to give financial support to various bodies under the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Temple-Morris, has explained to me that, because of important prior engagements, he regrettably cannot be here. That is a great pity.
	I want to refer briefly to the long speech that the noble Lord made then, which set out the circumstances in some detail. He spoke of the importance of the arm's length principle, which has been with us since 1945 and, as he reminded us, was introduced by Jenny Lee. He then drew attention to Section 28 of the Government of Wales Act 1998, which gave the Assembly the power to abolish a range of public bodies or absorb them into the Assembly. He pointed out that the exception provided some protection for a number of public bodies, because it debarred the Assembly from removing any function from organisations unless it was done with the consent of the body concerned.
	He quoted quite extensively from documents issued by the Labour Party before the introduction of the Act and specific undertakings given by Ministers in the other place that royal charter bodies such as the Arts Council of Wales, the Sports Council for Wales, the National Library of Wales, the National Museum of Wales and the Royal Commission on Ancient and Historical Monuments—bodies created by charter or royal warrant—were all protected in that way. He then described the circumstances that had arisen in the Welsh Assembly where Mr Pugh, the Minister concerned, sought to circumvent the restrictions in Section 28 by using the power to do anything that the Assembly considered appropriate to support a number of organisations, which are now contained in Clause 61. They were then in Section 32 of the 1998 Act.
	During the extensive debate that followed, the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, asked a very shrewd question. He asked what has happened to Section 28 of the 1998 Act. We were then told that it had not been repealed but was still in force.
	That brings me to my various amendments. It is rather unfortunate that the section, and the schedule which accompanies it, have not been repeated in the Bill. The equivalent provisions were placed very close together in the 1998 Act and anyone considering the powers under Section 32 would immediately have recognised that restrictions on those powers were provided by Section 28.
	In the light of what has happened, and the major row that developed in the Welsh Assembly, it is rather important that we do not separate the two provisions completely and tuck away Section 28 and the schedule in another Bill with which people will probably not be so familiar.
	My Amendments Nos. 78 and 80 would simply put Section 28 of the 1998 Act and its schedule back into the Bill. They are altered only by the deletion from Part I of the schedule of bodies that have already been abolished or absorbed. I have checked and got my information from the Welsh Assembly as to what those bodies are. Otherwise, Section 28 and its schedule are put back exactly as they were. Clearly the Government cannot have any objection to the section and the schedule, as they have not been repealed. It is simply a question of whether it is helpful to have their provisions in the Bill so that there is absolute clarity about the position.
	My Amendment No. 34 would do something new. It would make it clear that the power to "do anything" under Clause 61, which I put back into the Bill, cannot be used to overthrow the safeguards of the replaced Section 28. It would simply make it absolutely clear that the power to "do anything" does not override the restrictions in the section and its schedule. Having said that, I have discussed this with Mr Geraint Talfan Davies, the former chairman of the Welsh Arts Council, who I must say was not well treated on that occasion, but we have already covered that ground. He reminded me that it will still be perfectly open to the Assembly to provide grants to arts bodies and other organisations covered by Clause 61 so long as it does not do so on such a scale that it in effect abolishes them or so weakens them that they can no longer function. I am not a lawyer, but I suspect that if it went that far, it might be open to legal challenge as to whether it had gone too far. There is certainly a power, and rightly so, for the Assembly to provide grants on occasion to arts bodies. I did so when I was Secretary of State, as did a number of my successors. I supported the Welsh National Opera and various theatres in Wales when it was important that they should have one-off grants to deal with particular situations. I am not arguing in any way that that power should not be available, but my Amendment No. 35 does require the Assembly to consult the relevant bodies if that power is used. That is important. If you are going to give a grant, you will want to consult the relevant organisations on the effects of doing so. That provides a form of discipline so that the powers are not used unwisely and recklessly. That is the purpose of the first four amendments.
	Prompted by the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, we sought to inquire how much else of the 1998 Act had not been repealed and was still in force. I must say I was pretty startled when I got the schedule from the Minister. It appears that 36 sections of the 1998 Act and some six schedules—I think I have the calculation about right—still exist in whole or in part. Many of them have been amended, and some of them are being amended by the Bill that we are debating now. That will clearly create quite a problem for those who administer the law in any form, both in the Assembly and outside it, because in order to be sure of what the powers of the Assembly and the scope of the activities are, one has not only to refer to the Bill that we are debating today or indeed to the 1998 Act as it was, but to go through the extremely difficult and complex process of discovering how the many sections have been subsequently amended by changes not only by this Bill but by a whole list of Acts that have been passed in the interval. I think that I am right in saying that the Minister referred to just such an amendment to a section or schedule when we debated an amendment moved by my noble friend Lady Noakes.
	My final amendment is simple: within a year the Government should produce a consolidation measure. That would bring together in one Act a clear position on which people can base their judgments. Rather happily, we started the proceedings today with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor introducing a consolidation measure on other legislation. He pointed out that it is a simple process. It was moved without any dissent in the House and will be looked at by an appropriate committee. Therefore, there cannot be any great obstacle to having these two measures consolidated in this way.
	I have to confess that when I first looked at this Bill, in ignorance I thought that it was in effect a consolidation measure. I thought that it would cover all the matters that concerned the Welsh Assembly, which would be brought together in a different Bill. It was a bit of a revelation to discover how much of the 1998 Act would not be touched and would float around in its previous existence, although in a much more complex form because of the various amendments and repeals of individual sections. That is the basis on which I move my final amendment.
	I believe that the case originally made out by the noble Lord, Lord Temple-Morris, was powerful. There are grounds for concern about these important bodies, which should be provided with appropriate protection. I therefore hope that the House will support that view. I beg to move.

Lord Rowlands: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, for tabling his amendments. In doing so, it allows us to follow up the arguments and discussions that took place following the speech made by my noble friend Lord Temple-Morris. My noble friend has reminded us that his speech raised considerable concerns in many of our minds about what had happened. Initially, when we found out that Section 28 had not been repeated in this Bill, there was perhaps a natural, cynical suspicion that there was something behind this exclusion, However, as the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, has pointed out, when I saw the list of other clauses that have not been repeated, I did not find the absence of Section 28 as sinister as I perhaps initially thought. It is still there; it is in force; and it will apply.
	I am sorry to tell the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, that in doing this service to the House he has made me, and perhaps others, look at the extraordinary Schedule 4 to the 1998 Act. I apologise for my lack of memory or perhaps a lack of research, I cannot recall what I or others said on the schedule when the Bill was going through, but just look at the nature of it. There are an extraordinary four categories of quangos or bodies under the heading, "Bodies which may lose or gain functions", including:
	"An agricultural dwelling-house advisory committee . . . An agricultural wages committee . . . the Welsh Industrial Development Advisory Board . . . The Welsh Language Board".
	I plead ignorance on how originally Ministers explained what those four bodies have in common that led to them being bracketed in this way under this category. They are four extraordinarily different bodies in many respects. If there is a simple explanation, I would be willing to accept it. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, would be happy to give it.

Lord Rowlands: My Lords, the noble Lord would have made a good point if there had just been a schedule listing all the bodies, but we have a categorisation here that offers them four different kinds of protection ranging from minimal protection to retrenchment. But what have the first four bodies listed in the present schedule in common that causes them to be bracketed in this particular category?
	For example, let us take Part III, listing the Countryside Council for Wales, the Higher Education Funding Council for Wales and the Welsh National Board for Nursery, Midwifery and Health Visiting. Again, I should have asked in 1997 and 1998 when we were debating this issue: what do these three bodies have in common that requires them to be bodies which may only gain functions, but in this case not without consent? In Part IV I understand that there is a common denominator for the bodies listed. As the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, explained, in many cases they are chartered bodies or very well established. However, I have a problem with this part. I assume that it seeks to re-entrench these bodies. I have always believed that one of the great portents of devolution was to bring the quangos under control; it was one of the issues that swayed the referendum. People had concluded that quangoland had grown too big.
	While I shall pay tribute to them both in a moment, both the Sports Council and the Arts Council were in the vanguard of Welsh quangoland. Just as the Assembly has now brought into itself ELWa and the WDA, thus creating a better critical mass for policy-making and bringing operational policy together in some of these bodies, I see no reason why, at a date in the not too distant future, sports and arts issues should not also be part of the appropriate department of the Assembly Government—for the same reasons that these other bodies have been brought in already.
	When I served on the Richard Commission, one thing that struck me very forcefully when we looked at this area was that there was a growing tension between the quangos and Ministers. While it was never explicit, remit letters from Ministers grew longer and longer as they endeavoured to develop policy for these quango bodies. At the same time, the poor quango bodies had their budgets. While Ministers could tell them to do this, that or the other, they were not responsible for the budgets. That divorce between policy-making, management and operational issues has become increasingly less justifiable and defensible now that we have democratically elected Ministers in an Assembly to whom these bodies can be directly answerable. It is for Ministers to explain their decisions.
	Strangely enough, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, because he has prompted me to review my own thinking and to say that I could not possibly go into a Lobby and support the schedule as it stands. First, I do not understand how the bodies have been categorised and, secondly, I no longer believe in entrenching quangos because reversing that is one of the important processes of devolution.
	However, I support the noble Lord on Amendment No. 35. The Arts Council and the Sports Council have done very good work and I have admired the chairs of those bodies. I have had personal dealings with them and I have found them easy, transparent and helpful in every respect in all my constituency responsibilities in the past. It is no criticism of them but I believe that they should be democratised. However, until that happens, I think the noble Lord's Amendment No. 35 has considerable merit—I hope my noble friend will not slam the door on it—as, indeed, does his reference to consolidation. It may be that now is the time for that.
	What we admired about the drafting of this Bill as opposed to other Bills is that the parliamentary draftsmen did not do what they traditionally would have done: a paste and scissors job on the original 1998 Act. In fact, very unusually, this Bill was rewritten and incorporated all but 25 clauses from the original Bill. It is not as complete as we thought it was because now we know of all the clauses that have been left out. I think the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, has a very good point—at an appropriate moment there should be a consolidation so that we have one and only one Government of Wales Act. But I have to say to the noble Lord that I could not possibly go into the Lobby and support his schedule because the law that has stood since 1998 is, in my opinion, no longer relevant.

Lord Livsey of Talgarth: My Lords, we have had a very interesting debate, particularly as the previous two speakers were Welsh Office Ministers and speak with much experience of dealing with these bodies. I certainly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, that Amendment No. 35 is worth supporting. In the hiatus that has occurred in recent times, it would have been a vast improvement on what actually happened so far as consultation is concerned.
	I have asked a number of Assembly Members what they think about this amendment and there is a division of opinion among them—particularly in regard to those bodies in Part IV which may only gain functions and only with consent. It is almost as if what we have got here is a bonfire of the quangos and the exclusions are the point at which the matches got wet, or something like that, and did not bring it to a conclusion.
	The worries that people have are that the bodies in Part IV, in particular, are of great value and have status—I refer to the Arts Council, the National Library and the National Museum—and one asks the question whether it is necessary to bring them into the Assembly. I can see all the arguments why they should be—including the good reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, has just given—but the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, has also made a case for them being as they are in the amendment. One of the principles that we have got to address is that the amendment enables participation on a wider scale than would be the case if they were in-house in the Assembly, although of course the democratic aspect of that is extremely important and I do not underestimate it.
	There is also the issue of accountability. I certainly wondered at the time that if certain bodies which no longer exist as quangos had been made very accountable by, perhaps, having to report on a quarterly basis in front of Ministers and committees of the Assembly and being asked some very awkward questions as to what was happening, whether that different kind of model might have worked. It certainly might have worked in the case of the Arts Council. When one considers Amendment No. 35, if consultation had occurred perhaps things might have been a lot different.
	I think the noble Lord, Lord Temple-Morris, did us a big service by putting these questions and issues in front of the House. I think that on balance there is a case for retaining some of the remaining quangos—the five in Part IV—but it is extremely important that they are accountable to the Assembly, a democratic body, which can examine exactly what is going on so far as the finances and the running of these bodies is concerned.
	This is a mixed bag of amendments; they have been very helpful in producing the debate, particularly the suggestion in Amendment No. 104 on consolidation. It seems a good idea to consolidate all this so that we know exactly where we are with these bodies.

Lord Roberts of Conwy: My Lords, one of the most revealing debates we had in Committee was that initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Temple-Morris. I am delighted that my noble friend Lord Crickhowell has taken up the key themes. I fully support his amendment.
	The aim is to reinstate the basic protection that characterises chartered bodies such as the Arts Council of Wales. Whatever other views there may be, the status of those bodies, along with the variable status of other non-governmental organisations, was accurately described in Section 28 and the four parts of Schedule 4 to the Government of Wales Act 1998. Those provisions actually describe the statutory status of the various bodies. There is no doubt in my mind that the Assembly Government, in their haste to set alight the much-promised bonfire of the quangos, circumvented Section 28—I use the word used by the noble Lord, Lord Temple-Morris—when they considered the future of the Arts Council. They appear to have resorted to Section 32 for justification. That provision has been amplified and now appears in this Bill as Clause 61, while Section 28 has been left as a remnant in the 1998 Act.
	I hope that the Minister will either confirm or deny that Clause 28 is still required to complete the abolition of the Welsh Development Agency, the Wales Tourist Board, the Welsh Language Board, and other easily disposable quangos. It may well be, subject to confirmation, that Clause 28 accounts for their preservation.
	I shall not repeat many of the points that have been made, but I want to refer to the bonfire of the quangos—or the reform of Assembly-sponsored public bodies, to use the governmental terminology. Government departments had the benefit of Cabinet Office guidance on non-departmental public bodies. It was issued in September 2004, as far as I can make out, and arose, presumably, because of reviews of public bodies outside Wales at the time.
	The guidance states that a chartered body cannot be dissolved by Executive action. It then lays down the line that has, in effect, been taken with the Arts Council of Wales. The guidance goes on to say:
	"If the body concerned receives a grant-in-aid and the Secretary of State is responsible for all the appointments to the Board, then, if the Secretary of State wishes to cease funding that body and terminate the appointments or not renew them, the body would effectively cease to resist. If served with notice of the Secretary of State's intentions, the last act of the body should be to Petition for the surrender of the Charter. Arrangements would then be made for the disposal of any assets and liabilities before the process would be completed".
	That quotation comes from a research paper issued by the National Assembly for Wales.
	As I understand it, the Assembly Government have gone quite far down that road; their progress has been arrested only by the adverse vote in the Assembly in February. They have appointed a committee to look into this matter, and no doubt we will hear the outcome in due course.
	It is important to remember that after the Bill becomes law and Welsh Ministers become Ministers of the Crown under Clause 84 in certain circumstances they could petition the Privy Council to end the chartered body. Again, I would be grateful if the Minister would confirm my understanding of the position.
	I must return to another major point arising from our debate in Committee, when I described the action of the Assembly Government in the arts context as an error of judgment. The noble Lord, Lord Richard, intervened to say that that may or may not be right, but the question is whether this House should prevent the Assembly exercising that judgment. It was and still is a fair point. In a subsequent debate the noble Lord described himself as a genuine devolutionist rather than a restrictionist, and his meaning was perfectly clear.
	My immediate answer was to question whether it was right for this House to aid and abet the Assembly in what it was trying to do with the use of Section 32 of the 1998 Act and Clause 61 of this Bill by appearing to ignore the still-operative Section 28. The noble Lord, Lord Temple-Morris, also argued in his closing speech that, in view of the political and potential legal difficulties in the clash between Sections 28 and 32 of the 1998 Act, we clearly have a supervisory role. He argued very strongly that, in discussing a Bill that provides the mechanisms for further powers to be granted, we must surely be able to discuss the use made of powers already given. The same fundamental issue underlies today's debate. My personal view is that while I am content to allow the free exercise of powers for good or ill, I cannot tolerate or wilfully connive at a manipulation of powers that will undermine a longstanding and generally agreed principle, as the arm's-length principle in arts patronage certainly is. In my view, nothing but harm can come of it.
	With regard to the consolidation point in Amendment No. 104, the Minister was good enough to send me clarification about which parts of the 1998 Act were likely to survive this Bill. Clarification took the form of an annex listing clauses and schedules the Government did not intend to repeal and which would therefore remain in effect. It is a very mixed bag. After the swathe of repeals has been cut, some 12 sections and one schedule of that Act are subject to amendment by Schedule 10 of this Bill alone. Other sections and schedules are subject to change under this Bill, as is other legislation such as the Public Audit (Wales) Act and the Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Act. The net result is that it is indeed difficult to find out precisely what the law is in certain areas, as my noble friend Lord Crickhowell pointed out. I therefore endorse my noble friend's call for some consolidation of existing legislation.

Lord Crickhowell: My Lords, I listened with interest to what the Minister said. I understand entirely that putting the clause and schedule back into the Bill is not strictly necessary because the Act has not been repealed, but I advance the argument that it was important to have the two provisions standing together.
	Unless I am looking at a totally different Marshalled List from everybody else, there is some confusion. It was not Amendment No. 45 that roped back in the sections of the 1998 Act, but the later amendments. The key amendment for me is Amendment No. 34, which provides the power to do anything, subject to the limitations of the clause that is going back in and its schedule.
	I got a good deal of support around the House for my Amendment No. 35, which deals with consultation. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, for his observations. Like him, I entirely agree that there was nothing sinister in omitting the clause and the schedule from the Bill. I also welcomed his support for Amendment No. 35. He made a powerful speech suggesting that the powers of Section 28 and its schedule were not necessary, or should not be there, or should be altered or amended. But that is not what we are about here. That is not up for debate. If he had wanted to do that, he should have tabled appropriate amendments. The Government are not altering or repealing or changing Section 28 now, and probably for the reason that my noble friend Lord Roberts of Conwy declared—that it is still absolutely necessary if the so-called bonfire of the quangos is to go on. Without it, the whole process would be halted.
	We are not really debating whether these clauses should have been put into the original legislation, or whether particular organisations should have been given protection. They are listed as they are because they are charter bodies. There are appropriate ways of getting rid of charter bodies which are not covered by this Bill, or the 1998 legislation, and which need to be dealt with appropriately. There was a suggestion that these bodies should be subject to democratic supervision. I can only say that, in my time as Secretary of State, the National Museum of Wales, for example, as well as the National Library of Wales and the Royal Commission on Ancient and Historical Monuments, found their expenditure of moneys and so on under pretty close supervision at times by the Welsh Office. I am sure the Assembly has all those powers today. When I took the decision that we should fund the new galleries of the National Museum of Wales, my successor, the noble Lord, Lord Walker, intervened very tightly on how that project was run. So those powers are all there.
	We had a brief reference to the arm's-length principle. I happen to be one of those who believe it has stood the test of time. I think that to have an Assembly dealing with detailed day-to-day decisions on a whole range of arts bodies around the country would be a profound mistake. I follow the affairs of the Arts Council of Wales pretty closely. My wife was a member of it for seven, eight or nine years—I forget—and I attended a great many of the functions that it supported and have done so ever since. I am afraid I think that we need to ensure that the safeguards are retained, that people take notice of them, and that the arm's-length principle is upheld. Therefore, I intend to test the opinion of the House.

Lord Roberts of Conwy: My Lords, we welcome the Government's new clause, which fills a considerable gap that became glaringly obvious in Committee, when the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, introduced his new clause upon which the Government have closely modelled their own. The noble Lord is to be warmly congratulated.
	The new clause compensates for the inexplicable loss of Section 47 of the 1998 Act from this Bill, and the deplorable inadequacy of Clause 35 which replaced it. If the Bill, prior to the introduction of the new clause, provides an indication of the way the Assembly Government were going to treat the Welsh language after the emasculation of the Welsh Language Board and its merger with the Government, then all those protesters who have feared the worst were right to do so. The Government may have seen the light in the nick of time because the protests were mounting, and involving not just Cymdeithas yr Iaith—the Welsh Language Society—but the normally peaceful body Merched y Wawr, the Welsh women's movement. All are deeply suspicious of the Government's intentions.
	The new clause seeks to remedy the twin omissions noted by the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, in Committee, when he said:
	"They are, first, the omission from the Bill of a duty by Welsh Ministers to treat the Welsh language on a basis of equality with the English language, and secondly, the equally significant omission of a duty on Ministers to promote and facilitate the use of the Welsh language in the good governance of Wales".—[Official Report, 19/4/06; col. 1147.]
	Both requirements were enshrined in our Conservative Welsh Language Act 1993, which has served successive Governments, and the country, well over the years.
	As far as I can see, the only significant part of the clause of the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, that the Government have not incorporated into theirs is his requirement that there should be an annual assessment of the effectiveness of the Government's measures. I understand the Government's view that the annual report should provide an adequate indication of progress, or lack of it. Lack of progress would require an in-depth assessment of the measures taken.
	My personal concern about the new clause centres on subsection (5) and Welsh Ministers consulting,
	"such persons as they consider appropriate",
	before adopting or revising a strategy or scheme as described in the clause. I would like them to have to consult a statutory body of advisers with some expertise and experience in language matters.
	The only reason that I have not tabled an amendment to this effect is that I am told that the future of the Welsh Language Board is shrouded in a mist of uncertainty. Or is it?
	"On 30th November 2004 the First Minister announced that the Welsh Language Board would be merged into the Welsh Assembly Government"—
	so reads the opening sentence of the culture and language Minister's foreword to his consultative document of March this year on the future of the board and other related matters. He goes on to say:
	"The merger programme is already well on track and the merger of the Welsh Language Board will contribute to the creation of a core of the Welsh public service".
	It is difficult to see the Assembly Government resiling from that position—it is possible but unlikely. In its response to the consultative document in May, the Welsh Language Board seems to have given up the ghost, although I may be unfair to it in saying so.
	As I understand the consultative document, entitled Making the Connections, it is intended to retain the residual body that remains after the dissolution of the board in an advisory role under the chairmanship of the Minister until an independent regulator or judge adjudicator, sometimes referred to as "Y Dyfarnydd" is appointed in due course. It is not a very satisfactory proposition.
	Bearing in mind the short shrift given to the board and the totally unsatisfactory provision for the Welsh language in the Bill before the inclusion of the new clause, it is vital that we have a firm commitment from the Government to the substance of the new clause and the policy foundation that underlies it. That means that there should be statutory independent advisers to ensure it. The Assembly Government's own consultative document makes frequent reference to the need for "expert external advice" on Welsh languages issues. This is their opportunity to show that they mean it.

Lord Elystan-Morgan: My Lords, briefly but very sincerely, I also tender my congratulations to the Minister, to the Government and to the noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, on what I believe is a very significant step forward. I do not think that it was entirely worthy of the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy, to suggest that there was bad faith on the part of Her Majesty's Government, least of all any suggestion of sinister motives. However, it would have been easy for Her Majesty's Government to have said, "Well, by and large, this is what we have been doing for many years, this is the policy set out in publications such as Iaith Pawb"—that is the language of everyone. I believe that giving statutory sinew to the policies and practices of the Assembly is extremely significant. On the future of the Welsh language, the psychology is all important. The noble Lord, Lord Prys-Davies, says that its position is fragile. I am sorry to say that I completely agree with him. This House will have heard on many occasions a quotation from the famous words of Edmund Burke:
	"All that is necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing".
	For the Welsh language to remain in jeopardy, it is only necessary for those who wish it well to be utterly passive about its future.
	I am very glad to see the word "must" included. It occurs in Clauses 72 to 78 inclusive. Normally the mandatory provision in a statute is brought about by the use of the word "shall", but "must" makes it more mandatory still.
	I am very proud indeed to be in the House tonight to see a measure that I am convinced is of considerable significance as regards the future of the ancient language of Wales. Diolch yn fawr.

Lord Evans of Temple Guiting: My Lords, I am delighted that all noble Lords welcomed this amendment. I thank my noble friend Lord Prys-Davies for pressing this important point so effectively, with the result that we have today.
	Two questions were asked by the noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Conwy. I think the first has been answered by my noble friend Lord Prys-Davies. Subsection 8 of the new clause requires the assessment of effectiveness. The noble Lord mentioned consulting at least twice. This is a standard provision; there are similar provisions for the voluntary sector and business schemes. The Welsh Ministers should have some discretion. The Welsh Assembly Government have already established a practice of consulting widely on all such schemes and strategies, and that is what they will do with that.